Between freedom of speech and media character assassination: can a “value judgment” justify an attack on dignity?

In today's information society, where the battle for readers' attention often crosses ethical boundaries, the judiciary becomes the last line of defence of human integrity. As lawyers, we encounter every day a phenomenon in which the constitutional freedom of expression is used as a shield for targeting individuals. However, the right to one's own opinion is not a “blank cheque” for destroying another person's reputation.

A constitutional imperative: dignity above sensationalism

The basis of any dispute against a media publisher lies not in a mere insult, but in the violation of the highest legal act of the state. Article 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia proclaims: “Human dignity is inviolable and everyone shall be obliged to respect and protect it.”

When we analyse freedom of expression under Article 46 of the Constitution, we must understand its dual nature. It is absolute in the realm of inner thought, but externally limited by the rights of others to dignity, honour and reputation. The legal problem arises when the media, driven by commercial interest, forget that press freedom does not cancel the constitutional protection of the individual. Dignity is not an abstract notion: it is a legally protected good whose violation entails serious consequences.

The myth of the “value judgment” as an absolute defence

The greatest misconception in public discourse, and often in the defence strategies of media defendants, is the belief that it is enough to say “that is my opinion” to avoid liability.

In the courtroom, we draw a clear distinction between statements of fact and value judgments:

Statements of fact: they are subject to a test of truth. If a media outlet suggests that someone is involved in secret plans or acts as an agent of a foreign power, it is making a claim that must be supported by evidence.

Value judgments: although subjective, they must not be “free-floating”. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and our national case law require that a value judgment have a minimum factual basis.

Calling someone a pejorative name or attributing a subversive role in society to them, without a single real act that would justify such a conclusion, is not a value judgment: it is insinuation disguised as opinion. Without facts to support it, such a judgment becomes excessive and unlawful.

The Public Information and Media Act and the standard of “due journalistic care”

Article 9 of the Serbian Public Information and Media Act sets a rigorous standard: the editor and the journalist are obliged to verify the origin, truthfulness and completeness of information with the care appropriate to the circumstances.

Professional ethics is not merely a matter of codes, but a legal obligation. When a media outlet publishes information clearly aimed at discrediting someone, the court asks the following questions:

Did the journalist try to contact the other side?

The limit of criticism of public activity ends the moment criticism turns into deliberate labelling that threatens an individual's safety and social standing.

Slaviša Cincarević

Is there any material evidence for the epithets used?

Is the headline proportionate to the content, or does it serve solely as a means of targeting?

Article 79 of the Act is clear here: the dignity of the person (honour and reputation) enjoys protection regardless of whether the information is untrue, if its aim is the deliberate humiliation of an individual.

Political discourse and the limits of tolerance

It is often argued that public figures must have “thicker skin” and tolerate a greater degree of criticism. This is true, but that “thicker skin” does not mean an obligation to endure a media lynching. The limit of criticism of public activity ends the moment criticism turns into deliberate labelling that threatens an individual's safety and social standing.

When a narrative of “traitors”, “lobbyists” or “favourites” of hostile powers is created in public, the media do not contribute to a debate of public interest. On the contrary, they stifle debate by using speech that comes dangerously close to hate speech, in breach of Article 2 of the Act, which calls for preventing conflict and promoting the values of a democratic society.

Judicial protection: more than monetary compensation

When we file a lawsuit under Article 123 of the Act, the primary aim is not to enrich the client, but to restore their integrity.

Compensation for non-pecuniary damage: it serves to alleviate the mental suffering caused by stigmatisation in society.

Publication of the judgment: this is the key element. The editor's obligation to publish the operative part of the judgment without comment serves as a public catharsis and as proof that the law is stronger than circulation.

Preventive function: every judgment sanctioning unprofessional reporting is a brick in the wall protecting free and responsible journalism.

Conclusion: responsibility as the face of freedom

Media freedom is precious, but it is not a weapon. It is a tool for holding power to account, not for trampling on individuals. As lawyers, our mission is to remind media houses, through the application of the Constitution and the Public Information and Media Act, that their power also entails accountability before the courts.

The legal battle for honour and reputation is long and complex, but it is necessary. For if we allow labels to replace arguments, constitutional guarantees will become a dead letter.

This text expresses the author's professional opinion and does not constitute legal advice for a specific case.